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FORMATION OF CONCEPTS IN C. GEERTZ' INTERPRETIVE ANTHROPOLOGY

Summary: The article is dedicated to the problem of explication of the universals in the interpretive anthropology of C. Geertz. Authors analyse the method and conceptual constitution of C. Geertz's interpretive anthropology. In accordance with the thesis of the availability of "things themselves", C. Geertz defines universals as "empirically observable universal phenomena", which should represent "something essential", and not be "empty categories". They categorize it as a positively-oriented discipline aiming to explanative conclusions. The scheme of conceptual formation is explicated.

Key words: *interpretive anthropology, conceptual constitution, meaning, methodology, representation, universals.*

Theoretical achievements of C. Geertz have been thoroughly studied by numerous English-speaking social scientists. It is enough to mention such highly-reputed names as V. Crapanzano, S. Nugent, S. Reyna, P. Shankman, J. Spencer, etc. Interpretive anthropology has got its adherents in post-Soviet countries as well.

The interpretive trend in cultural anthropology has been explored by A. Boscovic, Yu. Dzhulai, V. Kaplun, I. Kasavin, V. Kilkeev, A. Zorin, A. Yelfimov and others. For example, V. Kaploun asserts that C. Geertz is proclaiming "a sort of a theoretical manifesto of the new approach in social sciences". In his opinion, C. Geertz is trying "to define the specificity of social anthropology as a science" through Ryle's concept of thick description. Contrary to the common opinion, the profile of social anthropology is not determined by field work, but rather by "a special intellectual effort" [11, p. 5, 6.]. V. Kilkeyev admits that C. Geertz applies a hermeneutical method but notices that "inner logic" of his methodological deductions remains vague [5, c. 141–142]. Thus, the methodological basis of the interpretive anthropology needs further elaboration.

Hence, the point we are focused on is the specific character of the conceptual constitution of interpretive anthropology. Finding the key to conceptual and methodological arrangement of interpretive anthropology could add up to the filling of methodological *lacunae* in social sciences of post-Soviet countries and be of assistance to current advances in humanities.

For C. Geertz anthropological analysis is not a sort of "conceptual manipulation of discovered facts, a logical reconstruction of a mere reality". He emphasizes: "To set forth symmetrical crystals of significance... and then attribute their existence to... universal properties of the human mind, or vast, a

priori weltanschauungen, is to pretend a science that does not exist and imagine a reality that cannot be found. Cultural analysis is (or should be) guessing at meanings, assessing the guesses, and drawing explanatory conclusions from the better guesses, not discovering the Continent of Meaning and mapping out its bodiless landscape” [10, p. 20].

Thus, interpretive anthropology is not in for abstract constructions and their application to facts with intention to build a theoretically perfect picture of cultural reality, but it is a positively-oriented discipline aiming to explanative conclusions.

The strategy of research for C. Geertz is “to hunt for universals in culture, for empirical uniformities that... could be found everywhere in about the same form, and, second, to an effort to relate such universals... to the established constants of human biology, psychology, and social organization”.

The author spots “a logical conflict between asserting that, say, "religion," "marriage," or "property" are empirical universals and giving them very much in the way of specific content, for to say that they are empirical universals is to say that they have the same content, and to say they have the same content is to fly in the face of the undeniable fact that they do not” [10, p. 38–40].

C. Geertz deduces concepts from the relevant aggregates of phenomena. We can also observe this trend in somewhat empirically-oriented conception of W. Dilthey [2, c. 273]. The “logical conflict”, admitted by him, is derivative of the reverse correlation between the scope and the content of concept. But he does not discern these aspects correctly, since he designates as “content” the filling of concepts applied in case study and the whole potential scope of their application.

Author of interpretive anthropology treats universals not as instruments of phenomena classification, but as the “core elements”, which exist beside secondary “numerous cultural particularities”. Adjectives “particular” and “universal” are conceptual denominations of facts. They deliver predicates to facts and convey important aspect of cultural reality. But the author transforms predicate into subject. Consequently, concepts turn to constituents of cultural reality itself.

Since the author focuses on cognitive product rather than cognizing process he is considering formed representations but not functional concepts. But already formed representations can't be the basis of cognitive logic since they are results of its application. The cognitive logic must “outrun” representations, i.e. it must be present in the process of cognizing before they are formed. But C. Geertz's reflections operate only in the realm of extant things. He notices existing representations but doesn't take into account the fact that their presence owes to a priori assumptions. Any concept, by its nature, is general [4, т. 8, с. 346]. Empiricism substitutes quality of generality, which is a priori inherent to any concept, by systematization of facts, which supposedly endows concept with this quality. Hence, generality became the product of “exercising” of phenomena's “empirical universality” by researcher. But facts, as “things of their own kind” each, initially can't have nothing common but name which they are embraced by. Thus “name” (i.e. concept) must be present *before* the procedure of generalization as a frame which facts should fit in. Herewith the filling of “generality” (its sense) is extracted from facts, which are transformed into scientific subjects.

He wants to underpin the validity of interpretive anthropology by positive heuristics; he tries to preserve the contents of case interpretations within theory. But this is a kind of utopian enterprise. Scientific knowledge is subject to specialization like any other activity. Consequently, theory needs *theoretical* grounding; it demands a theoretical subject of its own kind, which later will be projected on facts of case studies.

C. Geertz reduces the formation of conceptual apparatus to arrangement and interaction of representations. Author conceals the logical kernel of the problem under the layer of “extensive” rhetoric: the study of particular facts aimed at specificity he names “the study of small-scale object”, the study of facts with abstract intention he names consideration of “the great problems of reality”. He forgets that positive heuristics, which he hopefully takes for the basis of scientific validity, is the product of study

focused on specificity. Wherein the object of research can't be "small" or "large". It must correspond to the aim of case research and be related to the specific nature of the given branch of knowledge.

Nevertheless C. Geertz tries to reduce the *quality* of abstractness to the *size* of content. He does not take into account that the "size of object" is the property of the phenomenon itself, whereas the size of the content of representation is not [7, c. 78, 79, 85]. Hence concepts of anthropology, in his opinion, must picture cultural reality "itself". The author transforms mental act into existent "cultural model", finds his "real substitute" and reifies it. This is the way he formulates "big problems of reality" – metaphors of the scope of concepts, images of layman's everyday mentality.

In similar way C. Geertz treats "major methodological problem" of finding the transition "from a collection of ethnographic miniatures... to wall-sized culturescapes of the nation, the epoch, the continent, or the civilization" and of "moving from local truths to general visions" [10, p. 21].

Thus the epistemological problem of induction, which is inseparably entangled with the constitution of concepts, is transformed into the problem of summing up of representations. But pushed out of the door methodological problem comes back through the window in the guise of "general vision's" finding. And again the author treats it through an extensive constitution of concepts. Despite the widely-accepted stance of H. Rickert, who sees the goal of sciences of culture in the study of "historical individuum", C. Geertz takes an extensive sum of representations for the key to the constitution of concepts. [6, c. 277]. Thus, interpretive anthropology could hardly bind together the inductive method of concept formation and the logic of meaning.

So, from one side, the logic of interpretive anthropology appeals to epistemological and mental tradition invoked by hermeneutically-apprehended concept of meaning deduced from "inner experience" of individual and, from the other side, to empirically oriented inductive logic of positively-molded science which rests upon underpinning of objective "outer" experience. This dualism is the driving force of conceptual construction of the whole interpretive anthropology enterprise.

Let us resume: concepts of interpretive anthropology are constituted in an inductive way as "empirical universals"; the "extensive" logic of factual filling is the kernel of conceptual constitution. The scope of concept is covertly identified with the content of representation. Consequently, concepts of interpretive anthropology became implicitly analogous to representations.

This scheme of constitution does not fit with the concept of meaning, which is generic derivative of subjective hermeneutical logic and is hardly coherent with the established objective scheme of concept determination. That is why interpretive anthropology could hardly bind together the inductive method of concept formation and the logic of meaning. Consequently, all universal / particular difficulties are centered around the concept of meaning.

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